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1. The unconstrained model
To shed light on the differences between unconstrained and constrained perfect-foresight models a simplified
version of the model described in Verbon and Verhceven (1992) and Verhceven and Verbon (1991) is used.
The basic framework is a twoaverlapping generations model in which all individuals are identical except
for age differences. Each agent lives for two periods. As the model con[ains no production sector it can be
interpreted as a representation of a small open economy or as a model of a pure exchange ewnomy. An
individuai born at time t receives an endowment (or income) which is normalized at one. A part' r, of
this endowment is taxed away by the government and transferred to the old of that period (i.e. each old
individual receives a pension benefit of siu n r,, where n is the exogenously determined number of young
individuals per old individual, or equivalently, one plus the rate of population growth). The remainder is
used for old-age savings (s,), which eam no interest, and immediate consumption (c,Y). So:
c~Y ' f - r~ - s~. (1)
When old, the individual born at t consumes his savings and the transfer payment from the govemment:
c„~ - sr t n r~,t. (2)
Lifetime utility of an individual born at time t is the sum of his instantaneous utilities when young and
when old:
Vi ' u(crY) ' u(cra), (3)
where u: R„-R is strictly increasing in its azgument, twice differentiable, stricdy quasi-concave and
satisfies limu'(c)-m and limu'(c)-0.
cio
We assume decentralized and uncoordinated saving behavior. That is, the young maximiu their
lifetime utiliry using the saving rate as an instrumental variable and taking the current and next period's tax
rate as given. The first-order condition for this optimization problem reads u'(c,') - u'(c„t), which reduces
to:
s~ - 2( 1- r~ - n r~,~ ~. (4)
Note that savings in period t depend on the anticipated tax rate in period t t 1. Ezpectations aze assumed to
be rational in the sense of Muth (1961). [n the absence of uncertainty, [his boils down to perfect foresight.
The government, i.e. the politicians, decide on the tax-transfer scheme. They are under the
inFluence of both the young and the old and maximize the following interest function?
The notational rules of this paper are as follows. A subscript indicates the time period to which the
vaziable refers. If the subscript is omitted, the variable is a constant. A superscript denotes the age
of the individual concemed (y for young and o for old). Finally, we define j'(x) -~ t.
For a justification of this funetion see Verbon (1988). If n~.i the model outcomes roincide wi[h
the optimal policy of a govetnment that tries to maximize a social welfare function of the form
W-E;,o`á)`fl, (see the firstorder condition for taxes given below).z
D~ - 2u(c,) ' n~u(c~Y) ' u(c~:~)~~ (5)
where .i measures the effective political intluence of an old relative to a young individual. To measure the
total political power of the old versus the young generation, the relative numerical size of the young
generation n also has [o be taken into account. Mazimization of the political goal function yields the first-
order condition for taxes u'(c,Y)-Au'(c; ). Notice from this first-order condition and the condition for
optimal savings u(c,Y) - u'(c„t) that the model has no stationary state, unless .i - 1. For other values of
the power parameter .i the model will converge to a state in which per capita consumption of the young and
old is zero (if A~ 1) or their per capita consumption is infinitely lazge (if ~l~ 1). In bo[h instances either
savings or taxes will be negative. The absence of a stationary state for most parameter values precludes the
use of the standard methods to solve perfect-foresight models.
Let us now consider the dynamics of the model in more detaiL In order to simplify the analysis we
assume instantaneous utility to be logarithmic (u(c)-1n(c)). This implies that the first-order condition for
taxes r, can be wri[ten as:
.i(1 - s~) - s~-t
r~ -
n.,i
Eqs. (4) and (6) can be used to generate the following dynamical system:
s~ s, t






M~ - 2 2 } 1, N, -- 1 .
n
,i n ~i n
Note that one of the state variables (s~-t) is predetermined while the other (r~) is non-predetermined.
Now we can derive the locus on which the tax rate is constant (in the following we will refer to
this as the A r~ -0 locus):
2 .l
's~ t ' 2n ~.i(1 - n) 2n ~~l(1 - n)~
The analogously defined t,s~-t -0 locus is given by:
1 i .f .i
r, - - n . x s'-t } n . ,i .
(g)
(9)
Figures I and 2 indicate the typical dynamical development in Ure current modeL In the first figure
the relative power of an old individual x-1.25 and the relative population size n-2. The direction of
motion is indicated by dark arrows. Suppose, for ezample, that at time r-1 the economy starts in point A.
The following period the system is in B. Then, the economy goes to C, where previous period's savings
are ezactly zero, after which the ewnomy slowly converges to the zero-consumption state Z via D, E, F,
etcetera. Figure 2 is based on the assumption that politicians attach a relatively large weight to the welfare
of a young individual, i.e. ~l -.75, while n-2. In this case, the model converges to a state where [he old
and thc young havc an infinitc amounl of consumption. This implies Ihat taxcs must tx; infinitely largc whilc3
savings are minus infinity. Thus, starting in point A, the system ezplodes via B, C, D, e[cetera.
2. The constrained model
Let us contrast the model without wnstraints of the previous section with a model in which constraints on
the saving and tax rate have a decisive impact on the outcomes. Therefore, we introduce two constraints that
are more or less standard in the literature on the subject (see e.g. Hansson and Stuart ( 1989) and Verbon
and Verhoever. (1992)). Fitst!y, we n:!e out negative private saving (en the aggregate) as this itnplies ihat
resources are transferred from as yet unbom to current generations, which creates an enforcement
problem.' Another reason for imposing this condition is that it is physically impossible to have negative
aggregate savings in a(closed) exchange economy:
s~ z 0 for a!1 t. (10)
Secondly, we rule out negative transfers by assuming that property rights solely permit gifts to the preceding
generation during old age but not taking from them:
r~ z 0 for all t.
Figure l. The dynamics of public pensions and old-age savings For x-1.25 and n-2.
3 We abstain here from government debt.4
If requirements (IO) and ( I I) are combined with conditions (4) and (6) the first-order condi[ions for savings
and taxcs in [hc constrained model are obtained. When the non-negativity constraints (10) and ( I I) are not
binding the first-order conditions can be summarized by the dynamic system described by eqs. (7).
2.1 The stationary state of the constrained model
Let us derive [he stationary state of the constrained system by using Figure I. Suppose we start at timet- 1
in point B. Then, as in the unconstrained system, we are in C at [ime r-2. That is,(st,r2)-(O,r(C))
with r(C) -~-11 (this follows from eq. (6) with s, -s,-t -0). In the unconstrained system the economy
would go to point D in the next period. However, now not otily the anticipazed value for rj cotresponding
to point D ( r(D)) is consistent with the first-order conditions at time t-2, but also all points on the
vertical azis above D, that is all points (sz, r3) with r~ a r(D). To see this, note that 1 -rz -n r(D) -0,
implying that the optitnal saving rate sz-0 for all r~z r(D). So, at the time the path hits an axis (or put
differently, when a constraint becomes binding) a point can be tnapped on a half-line. This is an itnportant
feature, as it allows for an extra degrce of freedom. But which of the anticipated values for r3 on the half-
line are consistent with perfect foresight? In order to be an ezpectation formed under perfect foresight, it
does not suffice that the anticipated value of r~ is consistent with the first-order conditions in period 2. In
addition, the time path of saving rates s~ and tax rates r~ must be consistent with the firstorder conditions
Figure 2. The dynamics of public pensions and old-age saviugs Por l-.75 and n-2.5
for savings and taxes for all periods tz 3. As can be shown (see [he Appendix), this allows us [o select
r(C) as the unique anticipated value for r3. [n other words, there exists a unique stationary state that lies
at the intersection of the As,-O locus and the vertical azis. Following the same reasoning, (s, r) -(0, naa )
can be shown to be the stationary state for the constrained model for all ,i~ 1. In a similar way it can be
shown that in Figure 2, where A ~ l, the stationary-state outcome for the constrained model lies at point C
with (s(C), r(C)) -( 2,0). The system is taken to this outcome via point B, i.e. the intersection of the
Ar~-O locus and the horizontal axis.'
2.2 Uniqueness of the convergent path
Now wc have dcrived the stationary state of the constrained model, the question ariscs whether, as in the
I'amiliar unconstrained per(ect-foresight models, for any value of the predetermined variable (here: s,-t) a
unique value for the non-predetermined variable (here: r,) can be found that puts the system on a trajectory
to the stationary state. The answer for the current example is yes, as can be shown using Figure 1. In the
unconstrained system all points on line BC (the s[raight line that links points B and C) are mapped on line
CD. This follows from the linearity of the unwnstrained system. However, as explained above, in the
constrained systcm C is the stationary-state outcome and dces not lead to D. By the same token, in the
constrained system all points on line BC lead to C in the next period. So when initial savings are uro, the
stationary state can be reached immediately by setting the tax rate equal to r(C). For O~s~-t ss(B) the tax
rate can be chosen on line BC, bringing the system to the stationary state after one period. For
s(8)~s,.t~s(P) a poin[ on line PB can be chosen. This leads the system to a point on.line QC in the next
period. As line QC is part of line BC, this implies that the system stabilizes in C after two periods. For
initial savings larger than s(P) (e.g. s~-t-s(A)) one would like to choose a negative tax rate (e.g.
r~ - r(A )) so as to reach the stationary state in two ore more periods. This is not possible however. That is,
the non-negativity constraint on the tax rate is initially binding. In the unconstrained system, the economy
moves from point P to Q in the following period. As can be checked by comparing eqs. (4), (6), (]0) and
(11) this implies that the economy is in point Q in the constrained system if the economy was in point P or
in any point on the horiwntal axis to the right of P in the previous period. From Q the system gces to the
stationary state C. Therefore, we can conclude that for any value of the (predetetmined) savings rate s,-t a
value of the (non-predetermined) tax rate r~ exists that eventually leads to the stationary state. These values
of the jump variable are depicted as a thick line in Figure 1. As can be deduced from the dynamic
properties of the system no other choice for the initial r~ can lead to the stationary state. More importantly,
if the system is not put on the trajectory to the stationary state, the non-negativity constraints on the
variables will be violated within finite time. This leaves rational agents no choice but to opt for this
trajectory; only if the system is on this time path the first-order conditions can be satisfied in the current and
all future time periods. Similarly, it can be shown that the thick line in Figure 2 gives the values of the non-
' If the path of tax and saving rates hits the horizontal axis (i.e. r~-0), an extra degree of freedom
ensues in the decision-making process wnccrning s,. This is reflected one period later in Figurc 2
as it is drawn in (s,-~, r,)-space.r,
predetermined variable r,, given s,-[, that bring the system on the unique consistent perfect-foresight path
that eventually takes it to the stationary state in point C.'
2.3 Comparison with unconstrained perfect-foresight models
In contrast with the unconstrained model of section I there is always a stationary state in the constrained
model of this section. There are, however, more general and fundamental differences between a constrained
model as presented here and standard unwnsteained perCect-foresight models. For instance, it should be
noted that the result that there is only one consistent choice for the initial non-predetermined variable in the
constrained modcl dces not depend on the assumption of saddlepoint stability as in familiar unwnstrained
perfcct-foresight modcls. Furthermore, note that in the constrained model, no matter where you start, the
stationary state is rcached within a timited number of periods. In our cxample it takcs a maximum uf three
periods to reach the stationary state. In a familiaz unconstrained perfect-foresight model, on the other hand,
this state can be approached arbitrarily close, but the system will not really en[er the stationary state in finite
time. Moreover, the unique value of the jump variable is solely based on rationality requirements. That is,
we do not have to assume that the non-predetermined variable jumps so that the economy is placed on a
converging time path, as in familiar perfect-foresight models exhibiting saddlepoint stability. In those
models there in principle is an infinite number of trajectories that are divergent but nevertheless fully
rational, that is, consistent with the first-order conditions. In general these exploding trajectories can only be
excluded by assumption. Sometimes it is possible [o ezclude the divergent time paths by imposing
transversality conditions (see e.g. Blanchazd and Fischer (1989), Appendix 2A). However, transversality
conditions are in general sufficient, but not necessary requirements for optimal decision-making behavior
(see e.g. Seierstad and Sydsater (1977)).
In the familiar saddlepoint-stable perfect-foresight model the effect of shocks, whether anticipated
or not, can be analyixd in a simple way. The same is true for a constrained model as presen[ed here. In
case of an unanticipated shock the non-predetermined variable r~ immediately jumps to the convergent path
we just derived. However, contrary to an unconstrained model, in some cases the jump does rtot conflict
with the firstorder condítions of the predetermined variable. Suppose, for example, that the economy is in
the stationary state (point C) in Figure 1 when an unanticipated, once-and-for-all parameter change occurs
which causes the stationary state to shift a little upward on the venical azis. As we have seen such a point
may rationally be expected for a future time period if the economy is in point C. This implies that even if
the agents anticipate the shock, [hey will not change their behavior before the shock. They just adjust their
expectation of the tax rate that will hold at the time of the shock. Consequently, when the shock occurs the
new stationary state immediately results. The reason for this is that, confronted witó the higher future
pension benefits, they would have liked to decrease savings. But because saving is already equal to zero in
the stationary state, lhis is not possible.
Even more surprisingly, such a lethargic reaction can also temporarily occur when the shock is
' These results can rather easily be extended to the case of non-stationarity of the model's parameters
(or shocks) and a general form of the utility function lJ, (see Verhceven (1993)).anticipated. This can easily be understood. Suppose that the parameters aze constant and that the system is
initially in the stationary state. Suppose funhermore that the jump-variable r~ is changed in anticipation to a
future shock on the parameter set. In the case depicted in Figure 1, after the stationary-state outcome is left,
the system will transgress the non-negativity constrain[ on taxes after at most three periods. It follows from
the preceding analysis that this is a general result (unless x-1): starting from a stationary state, eqs. (10)
or (Il) will be violated within a finite number of periods after the taz rate is changed. Consequently,
rational savers and politicians will not immediately react to an anticipa[ed change in one of the pazameters if
this s!:ock wi!! ocaur ir. a future peried that is suff:cientiy disiant in time. So, if the system is in the
stationary state and it becomes known tha[ the parameter set will change in some future time period, the
typical pattem that emerges is that for a number of periods the stationary state is sustained, after which the
taz and saving rates are changed in anticipation to [he shock. Assuming the shock is temporary, the system
will return to the stationary state after a finite number of periods (see Figures I, 2 and 3 in Verbon and
Verhoeven (1992)). If the shock is permanent, the economy will converge to a new stationary state. It is
important to note that such a pattetn could not arise in an unconstrained perfect-foresight model. In these
models rational agents can never expect that an existing stationary state is disturbed for the first time at
some future period; that would contradict the firstorder wnditions of the predetetmined variable at the time
the stationary state is left. In a constrained perfect-foresight model agents can expect the stationary state to
be disturbed at some future time period since, as is demonstrated above, the deviation from the stationary
state can be consistent with the first-order conditions of the predetermined variable.
3. Conclusions
The introduction of constraints in perfect-foresight models can profoundly change its long- and short-run
propenies. In this paper, this is shown for a simple model of decision making on old-age saving and public
pensions. The underlying idcas can however be applied to other mudels by simply transplanting the methods
used ín sections 2.1 and 2.2. Consider e.g. the extension of the Samuelson (1958) overlapping-generations
model with money analyzed by Blanchazd and Fischer (1989) in Chapter 5. They conclude that if the
monetary equilibrium is unstable, all paths should be excluded on whicó initial savings of young individuals
(or the demand for money) is larger than in the monetary equilibrium. They base this conclusion on the
observation that on these paths savings will be ever-increasing without converging to some upper bound.
But, as Blanchard and Fischer argue, savings can never exceed available endowments, so these ezplosive
paths must be excluded. In other words, paths with an initial level of savings that is higher than in the
monetary equilibrium are excluded by referring to some upper bound on savings. However, if the this upper
bound is introduced expticitly rather than implicitly in the model, it can readily be established that there
emerges a new stationary state in which the saving rate equals this maximum level. In the vein of the
analysis of the previous sections, it can then also be shown that this stationary state is reached within a finite
number of periods as long as savings in the initial period are larger than in the mone[ary equilibrium.
Another example where constraints on the parameters have an imponant influence on Ihe outwmes
is Hansson and Stuart (1989). They develop a model of decision making on old-age savings and
intergenerational transfers in which political decision making is assumed to be constitutional. Both savingss
and transfers are required to bc non-negative. As in the model of this paper, the stationary-state ou[comes
are determined by these constraints. Moreover, the stationary state is reached in finite time (see e.g.
Hansson and Stuan (1989) note 11). Contrary to this note, however, Hansson and Stuart (1989) (as well as
Verbon and Verhceven (t992) and Verhceven and Verbon (1991)) fail to give insight in a general and
practical analytical toolbox that can be used to handle discrete-time perfect-foresight models with constrained
state variables.
Appendix
In this Appendix it is shown that in the case of Figure 1, if the system is in point C at time t(or
(s~.~, r,)-(s(C), r(C))), the only expectation consistent with perfect foresight is that it will still be in C in
thc nczt period (or (s~,r~,~)-(s(C),r(C))). Let us first suppose that the cons[raint s,z0 is not binding.
Then, agents anticipate the economy to go to D, E, F, etcetera, which is impossible due to the non-
negativity constraint on taxes. Consequently, the constraint on s, is binding implying that s,-s(C). Now it
remains to be established that r~,t - z(C). All choices for r~,~ on the vertical axis above C( r~,t ~ r(C),
s, -0) lead to an inconsistency: given that s,-0, substitution of the constraint s~,~ z0 in equation (6) implies
that r„t s r(C), which contradicts the assumption that r~,~~r(C). It is also impossible thatr„t s r(D)
since r~,~~ r(D) is inconsisten[ with (s~-~, r~)-(s(C), r(C)). h was already excluded [ha[ r~,t - r(D) as
then the non-negativity constraint on taxes would be violated after two periods. The expectation
r(D)~r„~~r(C) leads to the same inconsistency; from a point on the line CD the system will go to a
point on DE and so on, sooner or later crossing the horiwntal axis. So, every other anticipation than
r~,~ - r(C) is not consistent with perfect foresight. To check that the anticipation r~,t - r(C) is consistent
with perfect foresight it suffices to show that s~ is constrained to zero. This is true as long as .i~l: then
i(1 - r- n r)~0 for r --"A . Obviously, A-1.25 satifies this condi[ion.O
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